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Abstract: This paper studies the resilience of inter-ethnic marriages in Italy through the lenses of 
marriage duration by means of survival and treatment-effect analyses. Our main findings are that 
inter-ethnic marriages have a significantly higher risk of separation even when we control for social 
and economic characteristics of the spouses; however, when we restrict the analysis to more recent 
marriages, we observe that co- and inter-ethnic marriages converge in longevity. Finally, we find 
evidence of self-selection into inter-ethnic marriages. Overall our findings points to a society that is 
becoming increasingly open to cultural and ethnic diversity, as well as more secular. 
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1. Introduction 
Italy is historically a country of emigration with no relevant colonial past. Only recently it 
experienced a surge in immigration. The share of foreign (legal) residents in the population rose 
from 2.2 percent in 2002 to 8.1 percent in 2014. With the influx of immigrants came a considerable 
increase in inter-ethnic marriages, defined as those involving one native-born (i.e., Italian) and one 
foreign-born spouse. Against a declining trend of the number of marriages, reflecting a long-run 
shift towards new models of family and towards a more secular society, the share of inter-ethnic 
marriages rose sharply, from 4.4 to 14.8 percent between 1995 and 2012 (ISTAT, 2014). 
A marriage of a non-native to a local is regarded as the ultimate form of assimilation of the 
former (Ham and Tammaru, 2011; Tolsma et al., 2008,). It exemplifies mutual social acceptance 
and openness of a society. The question asked in this paper is whether these marriages are less 
“stable”  as compared to co-ethnic ones. We ask whether, from an empirical point of view, inter-
ethnic marriages are more prone to disruption than co-ethnic ones, as a result of cultural differences 
such as the role of women in society, religious beliefs, or the transmissions of values to children. 
These differences, on top of those relating to income, education, age, just to mention a few, are the 
focus of this paper. The issue of the resilience of inter-ethnic marriages is important for several 
reasons. First, it provides evidence on how cultural conflicts may affect the transmissions of values 
(Bisin and Verdier, 2010). Second, it documents the extent that integration has been, and is likely to 
be, successful in Italy, with important social and political implications in the context of the recent 
social alarm caused by the rapid surge in immigration. 
This study exploits a novel micro data set, made available through a research agreement 
with the Italian Statistical Agency, ISTAT. The dataset covers the universe of all marriages and 
separations (the first step before divorce in the Italian law) that have taken place in Italy between 
2008 and 2010. We estimate a number of empirical models in order to explain the determinants of 
the longevity of inter- and intra-ethnic marriages, our measure of “stability/resilience” of a 
marriage. 
The outline of the paper is the following. Section 2 discusses the literature and notes that 
there are very few studies that satisfactorily address the issue of resilience of inter-ethnic 
marriages. Section 3 presents the data set on marriages and separations and shows that duration of 
inter-ethnic marriages is sensibly lower than that of co-ethnic couples. Section 4 employs 
econometric analyses to examine how robust this result is when we add controls for the different 
characteristics of the spouses. First, we estimate a “survival model” that accounts for important 
characteristics of the spouses, such as age, income, education, and employment status. We devote 
particular attention to computing measures of “distance,” taking into account geography, proxies 
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for religious beliefs, and for the ex-ante “attachment” to the marriage. Secondly, we employ 
treatment-effect analysis in order to address two important issues relating to the causal 
interpretation of our results. The first is that of the “missing counterfactual”: what if spouses in 
inter-ethnic marriages had married a co-native? The second is self-selection into inter-ethnic 
marriage: what if the spouses who married foreign partners were among the least or the most 
attached to the idea of a (ever-) lasting marriage? To the best of our knowledge, the literature on 
the economics of marriages and divorces has never addressed these problems. 
Our main findings, summarized in Section 5, are as follows. The (unconditional) average 
duration of an inter-ethnic marriage is about two-thirds of that of a marriage between co-natives. 
Even when we control for social and economic characteristics of the spouses, we find that inter-
ethnic marriages have a significantly higher risk of separation. In particular, separations occur 
earlier with the following conditions: when spouses marry younger, when either (but not both!) 
spouse is unemployed, when there are no kids, when the first kid is female, when spouses celebrate 
a civil (as opposed to religious) rite and choose a separation (as opposed to common) property 
regime, when the wife is more- and the husband less- educated, when spouses earn a higher income. 
However, when we restrict the analysis to more recent marriages, we observe that co- and inter-
ethnic marriages converge in longevity. Finally, we find evidence of self-selection into inter-ethnic 
marriages: spouses who are “less marketable” in the co-ethnic marriage market tend to self-select 
into inter-ethnic marriages. Spouses also self-select into inter-ethnic couples more frequently when 
they share the same religion. In the most recent cohorts of marriages, however, we observe a 
different kind of self-selection: spouses who are less attached to the (idea of ever-lasting) marriage 
are more likely to marry inter-ethnically. All these findings point to a society which is becoming 
increasingly open to cultural and ethnic diversity, and increasingly secular. 
 
2. A Review of the Literature. 
In his seminal contribution, Becker (1974) (see also Becker et al., 1977; Stevenson and 
Wolfers, 2007) discusses the reasons why people choose partners who are more (positive assortative 
mating) or less (negative assortative mating) similar to them in terms of shared values, tastes, 
abilities, and so on. This choice depends on the complementarity or substitutability of traits in the 
household’s “production function.” Characteristics such as shared values are complements, and as a 
consequence partners will prefer similar partners. For example, sharing the same culture is valuable 
as it makes education and values’ transmission to children easier. In contrast, different abilities in 
market versus non-market activities can be considered as substitutes, so that “negative assortative 
mating” will occur. Having different abilities may be desirable, as it allows a task specialization 
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within a couple (“raising the children” versus “bread-winning”), and this allows each partner to 
specialize in his/her comparative advantage, thus raising the family’s income and welfare. 
Separations follow a similar logic, and depend on the comparison of the utility from the current 
match (marriage) relative to the expected utility of being single and possibly re-marrying in the 
future. 
The theory suggests that spouses in inter-ethnic marriages that do not share important beliefs 
and values may separate earlier. Many studies find evidence of a higher risk of marital dissolution 
among inter-ethnic couples (Dribe and Lundh, 2011, Kalmijn et. al., 2005). Studies tend to attribute 
the instability of inter-ethnic marriages to cultural and religious “mismatches,” which may generate 
conflict, reduce the value of the marriage, and lead to increased likelihood of a break-up. Heaton 
(2002) finds that a higher risk of dissolution is positively associated to the parents’ experience of 
divorce, and is negatively associated to the presence and number of children, income, and job 
qualification. Children from inter-ethnic couples are also found to be exposed to a higher risk of 
marriage dissolution (Gruber, 2004). 
There is a large empirical literature concerning the role of personal traits in positive versus 
negative assortative mating, (Dupuy and Galichon, 2014; Humbad et al., 2010). Studies have 
focused on physical and cultural traits, such as age (Choo, 2015; Choo and Siow, 2006); education 
(Jones, 2010); height, intelligence and religion (Kalmijn et al., 2005); race and ethnicity (Bratter 
and King, 2008, Feng et al., 2012; Frimmel et al., 2012); income and body mass index (Chiappori et 
al., 2012). Inter-ethnic marriages have been considered in the migration literature, in order to 
understand the process of assimilation (Algan et al., 2012; Constant and Zimmermann, 2008; 
Constant et al., 2009; Meng and Gregory, 2005). 
While most empirical studies consider the issue of marriage stability in general, only a few 
ones focus on the relative risks of dissolution of inter- versus co-ethnic couples. Typically, these 
latter studies control for race, and rank the risk of dissolution of different types of couples, typically 
in the US and the UK. They find that the ethnic couples who are most at risk of dissolution are the 
Blacks, followed by the Whites and the Asians. Depending on data availability, cultural differences 
are typically measured by citizenship, race, ethnicity, place of birth (Monahan, 1970, Teachman, 
2002 for the US; van Huis and Steenhof, 2003 for the Netherlands). Employing birthplace, race, and 
ethnicity, instead of citizenship, has the advantage that the former characteristics are individual 
time-invariant, so that we will use the place of birth in order to identify “inter-ethnic marriages.” 
One of the few studies that explicitly consider marriage stability for inter-ethnic couples in 
Germany is Milewski and Kulu (2014). Their main finding is that inter-ethnic couples show higher 
dissolution rates compared to homogeneous (i.e., native-native and foreign-foreign) marriages, an 
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effect which persists even when individual spouses’ characteristics are taken into account. A major 
criticism of the empirical literature is that it is mainly descriptive and often fails to account for 
important “confounding factors” related to race/ethnicity. The typical example is age: inter-ethnic 
couples often tend to be younger, and younger couples may be more likely to separate (Feng et. al., 
2012; Lehrer, 2008). 
The literature on Italy is very scarce, particularly regarding the dissolution of inter-ethnic 
marriages. This is due to two main reasons: on the one hand, Italy legalized divorce only in 1970, 
relatively late compared to other countries1; on the other hand, immigration is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, so that, until a decade ago, inter-ethnic couples were very rare. De Rose (1992) is the 
first paper to study marital instability in Italy. He finds that women who enter into the marriage 
market earlier, who have better education and have full-time jobs, and who reside in large towns in 
the North West of Italy are the most exposed to the risk of marital disruption. Vignoli and Ferro 
(2009) analyse trends in legal separations between 1969 and 2003, and find that the probability of 
dissolution tends to increase until the fifth year of the marriage, peaks between the 3rd and the 8th 
year, and stabilizes afterwards. However, they do not consider inter-ethnic marriages. Manasse and 
See (2013) use ISTAT Census data for marriages to analyse marriage dissolution of inter-ethnic 
couples. They find evidence of a gender gap: Italian women in inter-ethnic marriages are more 
likely to separate than their co-ethnic counterparts, while Italian men are less likely to do so. 
However, their data track the life of a marriage for a few years from the celebration date, so their 
analysis cannot cover most of the separations that occur later in the marriage life.  
This paper considers the issue of the resilience of inter-ethnic couples from another 
perspective: marriage duration. We look at marriages that end-up in separations, so that our 
observations can track back in time the entire history and duration of each marriage. Moreover, we 
improve on the current literature in many ways. We consider many confounding factors, in 
particular several measures of “distance” among spouses (geographical, economic, and cultural). 
From a methodological point of view, we improve upon the literature by addressing the issue of 
causality with treatment-effects techniques. In fact, we address two important problems that have 
been completely neglected by the literature. The first is the long-standing issue of the missing 
counterfactual: in order to assess the causal effect of an inter-ethnic marriage on the marriage 
duration, we should know how the marriage would have lasted had either spouse married a co-
native instead of a foreigner (and vice-versa for a co-ethnic marriage), an event which of course we 
                                                          
1 The initial legislation of divorce, which was passed after a Referendum, was quite strict, requiring 5 years of prior legal separation 
and a court verdict. This was amended in 1987, with the requirement being reduced to three years, and recently in 2015 to one year 
(six months for consensual separations). Note that only 6 in 10 separations end in a divorce, given that there are considerable legal 
costs involved. Thus many studies, including ours, focus on legal separations (Salvini and Vignoli, 2011) for a discussion of Italian 
legislation. 
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do not observe. The second problem is that of endogeneity, namely the fact that the assignment of 
our “treatment” (marrying a foreign partner) is non-random, and may be correlated to the outcome 
(the time to separation). In short, the choice of marrying a foreign spouse may depend on some of 
the spouse’s characteristics which we do not (fully) observe, and that may influence the choice of 
marrying a foreigner and the dissolution of the marriage simultaneously. 
 
3. The Data 
Thanks to a research agreement with ISTAT, the Italian Statistical Agency, we have access 
to the Census of separations (258.302 separations) and the Census of marriages (694,004 marriages) 
for the years 2008-2010, which record all the separations and marriages that occurred in Italy during 
this period. The datasets contain information on dates (wedding, separation, and divorce); the type 
of wedding rite (civil/religious); the regime of property chosen by the couple 
(commonality/separation); the type of separation agreement (judicial/consensual); the value of 
“money transfers” between ex-spouses and the house assignment; and the terms of children custody. 
It also contains information on the individual spouses, such as their places of residence, birth dates, 
marital status prior to marriage, the number, sex, and ages of children at separation, the assignments 
of children after the separation, the spouses’ educational attainment, place of birth, and citizenship 
(but there is no individual information on race, ethnicity, religion). Concerning the spouses’ 
economic status, we observe their employment/unemployment situation, and if employed, the type 
and sector of occupation. As explained earlier, and unlike Manasse and See, 2013, this paper does 
not employ the Census marriage data for the empirical analysis, because we cannot track what 
happens to marriages beyond 2010. Instead, the Census for separations contains records of 
marriages that lasted from 0 to 65 years, and which ended in a separation during the period of 
observation, 2008-10 and this enables us to evaluate the duration of marriages.2 In the analysis, we 
consider the “time-to-separation” or the longevity as our measure of “marriage resilience.” 
Table 1 contains a number of descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the sample 
analysed. The table classifies marriages and separations in five types: co-ethnic with both Italian-
born spouses, inter-ethnic with Italian husband, inter-ethnic with Italian wife, co-ethnic with both 
foreign spouses born in the same country, and inter-ethnic with both foreign spouses but born in 
different countries. We observe the full population of separations that occurred in Italy in the years 
2008, 2009, and 2010 (see Panel A). Each wave contains comparable though increasing number of 
observations of couples separating each year. In every year, (separations of) co-ethnic marriages 
                                                          
2 The Census divorce dataset contains only information on those marriages that end up in a divorce, which according to the Italian 
law of this period require at least three years of prior legal separation. This dataset therefore contains less information compared to 
the Census of separations, so we do not use it in the analysis. 
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between Italian spouses represent the bulk of the observations (3-year average of 88.8 percent, see 
first row of the table). Looking at the “year of marriage,” we can see the strong increase in the 
frequency of inter-ethnic marriages in the sample: for example, inter-ethnic marriages with Italian 
husbands constitute about 6.6 percent of all marriages that end in a separation in 2008 and rise to 
8.10 percent in 2010. This is apparent also by looking at different cohorts of marriages: among the 
total number of the inter-ethnic marriages with Italian husbands (wife) recorded in our sample, 
those celebrated in the period 1942-1980 make up only 4.30 percent (4.9 percent, respectively), 
compared to 3 percent (49 percent, respectively) that were celebrated in the most recent period of 
2001-2010. 
 
Year and Duration of Marriages  
Panel A of the table also shows the distribution of marriages by decade in the sample. In 
total, marriages celebrated between 1942 and 1980 are about 13 percent of the observations, while 
those celebrated in the period 1981-1994 are about 35 percent; marriages celebrated in 1995-2000 
and in 2001-2010 are about 22 percent and 30 percent of the sample, respectively. 
The table shows the average resilience or longevity of marriages in the sample, our variable 
of interest, also visualized in Figure 1. 
In the entire sample, co-ethnic marriages between Italian-born couples last about 15.6 years 
on average, while inter-ethnic couples are less durable. Those with Italian husbands last 
considerably less, about 9.9 years, and those with Italian wives about 10.5 years. The least durable 
are the inter-ethnic couples of different countries of origin, lasting an average of 8.4 years. 
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Origin of Spouses 
Table 1 also provides information about the origins of foreign partners in inter-ethnic 
marriages. Most foreign partners of Italian spouses were borne in other European countries: 69.7 
percent of foreign husbands and 77.1 percent of foreign wives. In particular, Italian men and women 
tend to marry spouses born in neighbouring countries (not shown in the table), such as Austria (12 
percent of inter-ethnic marriages for both Italian husband and wives) and Switzerland (3 percent 
and 5.2 percent, respectively), or born in traditional emigration destinations, such as Germany (2.7 
percent and 4.4 percent) and Belgium (2.3 percent and 3.4 percent). The most frequent cases 
however are that of Albanians (21 percent and 19 percent of foreign wives and husbands, 
respectively) followed by Romanians (4 percent of foreign wives but only 1.2 percent of foreign 
husbands). Italian men and women differ in their second-most popular foreign partners. Latin 
American and Caribbean wives come second for Italian men (10.5 percent of their inter-ethnic 
marriages) but only third for Italian women (6.2 percent). Brazilians and Cubans are the most 
popular from this region (2.6 percent and 2.4 percent of foreign wives, and 1.2 percent and 1 
percent of foreign husbands, respectively). By contrast, Middle Eastern-North-African and Sub-
Saharan African partners are the second most frequent foreign husbands of Italian women (14 
percent and 3.6 percent, respectively), with Morocco (4.2 percent), Egypt (4.1percent), Tunisia (2.5 
percent) and Senegal (1 percent) as the most frequent origin. These countries are virtually absent 
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Figure 1. Average Duration of Marriages, by Couple Type
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Husband For. - Wife For_same Husband For. - Wife For_diff
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among the foreign wives of Italian men. The opposite is true for Eastern Europe: spouses from 
Ukraine, Poland, and Moldavia are relatively frequent among inter-ethnic couples with Italian 
husbands (1.4 percent, 1.2 percent, and 1 percent, respectively), but absent in those with Italian 
wives. 
The geographical composition of inter-ethnic marriages is likely to depend on preferences 
for cultural proximity, a topic that we will discuss below, but surely also reflect the “supply side” 
factors linked to the composition of immigration. Available data from ISTAT (2014) reveal that 
while the total number of male immigrants is similar to the total number of female immigrants, 
there are strong genre asymmetries in their geographical origins. Females exceed males among 
immigrants from Eastern European countries, with very high female/male ratio for Ukraine (3.75 
percent), Poland (2.8 percent). Moldova (1.9 percent), Bulgaria (1.7 percent). The opposite is true 
for African countries such as Senegal (0.4 percent), Egypt (0.5 percent), Tunisia (0.6 percent), and 
Ghana (0.72 percent), where immigrants are predominantly male. As a consequence, Eastern 
European women and African men are in “excess supply” in the “co-ethnic” marriage market, 
which may account for the relatively high frequency of inter-ethnic marriages involving eastern 
European wives and African husbands.  
 
Geography 
We also consider the role of geographic distance between the spouses’ cities of birth 
exploiting the Geo database. We are interested to see if, for example, marriages of spouses born in 
far-apart Italian towns (e.g., in Friuli in the North East and in Sicily) are more “fragile” than those 
born in the same place. For inter-ethnic couples, we calculate the distance between Rome and the 
foreign capital. The descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 1 show that the sample average 
distance of Italian spouses’ place of birth of 147 kilometres is not negligible. 
 
Socio-economic Characteristics 
Panel A also shows the descriptive statistics for the spouses’ characteristics. The average age 
difference between husband and wife is about 3.3 years. Inter-ethnic couples are however 
noticeably different from the other types: Italian husbands in inter-ethnic marriages are considerably 
older at marriage than the Italian men in co-ethnic couples (35 against 29 years), and the age 
difference between spouses is more than twice the average in magnitude (7.1 against 3.1 years). 
Conversely, Italian wives in inter-ethnic marriage have almost the same age as their foreign 
husbands. 
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Concerning education, “positive assortative mating” seems to prevail in the sample, with 
about 63 percent of spouses having similar education levels and about one-fourth of the couples 
having more educated husbands (not shown in the table). Interestingly, Italian husband in inter-
ethnic couples are significantly less educated than Italian husbands in co-ethnic marriages, with a 
higher percentage of the sample reaching secondary education (45 percent against 40 percent), and 
a lower percentage with high school education (38 percent against 40 percent). A similar, but less 
pronounced, pattern holds true for Italian wives in inter-ethnic marriages, with higher percentage of 
the sample with secondary education, and those with high school diploma slightly lower than in co-
ethnic marriage (39 vs 35 percent and 43 vs 44 percent, respectively). 
The presence of children, which is possibly the most important outcome of a marriage, is 
starkly different between co-ethnic and inter-ethnic couples recorded in the Census. About 55 
percent (45 percent) of inter-ethnic couples with Italian husbands (wives, respectively) have no 
children, compared to only 29 percent (33 percent) of Italian (respectively, foreign same-country) 
co-ethnic marriages. 
Moving to economic characteristics that are reported in Panel B, the table reveals some 
interesting information. Spouses in co-ethnic marriages (both Italian and foreign) are the most likely 
to have both spouses employed, compared to those in inter-ethnic ones. Meanwhile, both the 
foreign wives and foreign husbands in inter-ethnic marriages are more likely to be unemployed 
compared to their Italian counterparts in co-ethnic marriages. 
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Table 1. Census of Separations (Panel A) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PANEL A Full sample Husband Ital. - Wife 
Ital.
Husband Ital. - Wife 
For.
Husband For. - Wife 
Ital.
Husband For. - Wife 
For_same
Husband For. - Wife 
For_diff
Observations (%) 258,302 (100.00) 229,459 (88.81) 17,235 (6.67) 8,402 (3.25) 2,253 (0.87) 953 (0.37)
Year of Separation/Waves, n (%)
2008 84,165 (32.58) 74,981 (89.09) 5,544 (6.59) 2,633 (3.13) 751 (0.89) 256 (0.30)
2009 85,945 (33.27) 78,395 (91.22) 4,546 (5.29) 2,146 (2.50) 643 (0.75) 215 (0.25)
2010 88,192 (34.14) 76,083 (86.27) 7,145 (8.10) 3,623 (4.11) 859 (0.97) 482 (0.55)
Year of Marriages, n (%)
1942-1980 33,148 (12.83) 31,883 (13.89) 741 (4.30) 414 (4.93) 81 (3.60) 29 (3.04)
1981-1994 90,252 (34.94) 83,947 (36.58) 3,514 (20.39) 2,028 (24.14) 606 (26.90) 157 (16.47)
1995-2000 57,759 (22.36) 51,303 (22.36) 3,903 (22.65) 1,828 (21.76) 539 (23.92) 186 (19.52)
2001-2010 77,143 (29.87) 62,326 (27.16) 9,077 (52.67) 4,132 (49.18) 1,027 (45.58) 581 (60.97)
Duration of Marriage, in years 14.98 (10.55) 15.59 (10.64) 9.93 (8.13) 10.54 (8.70) 10.63 (8.37) 8.42 (7.62)
Regions
Husband, Asia Pacific 258 (0.10) 148 (2.38) 88 (6.33) 22 (3.02)
Husband, Europe 252,293 (98.93) 229,459 (100.00) 17,235 (100.00) 4,327 (69.67) 808 (58.13) 464 (63.65)
Husband, Latin America-Caribbean 886 (0.35) 524 (8.44) 281 (20.22) 81 (11.11)
Husband, Middle East-North Africa 1,068 (0.42) 856 (13.78) 111 (7.99) 101 (13.85)
Husband, North America 149 (0.06) 132 (2.13) 3 (0.22) 14 (1.92)
Husband, Sub-Saharan Africa 370 (0.15) 224 (3.61) 99 (7.12) 47 (6.45)
Wife, Asia Pacific 479 (0.19) 358 (2.66) 88 (6.33) 33 (4.26)
Wife, Europe 249,582 (98.46) 229,459 (100.00) 10,379 (77.13) 8,402 (100.00) 808 (58.13) 534 (68.90)
Wife, Latin America-Caribbean 2,213 (0.87) 281 (20.22) 129 (16.65)
Wife, Middle East-North Africa 554 (0.22) 111 (7.99) 34 (4.39)
Wife, North America 244 (0.10) 3 (0.22) 5 (0.65)
Wife, Sub-Saharan Africa 410 (0.16) 99 (7.12) 40 (5.16)
Geographical distance of birthplaces, in kilometers587.82 (1728.55) 147.71 (330.29) 5,779.95 (2936.76) 5,375.84 (2619.67) 0.00 (0.00) 3,642.55 (3793.00)
Ages and age differences, in years (sd)
Age difference 3.26 (5.35) 3.07 (4.69) 7.13 (8.81) 0.33 (7.76) 3.23 (6.16) 3.64 (8.39)
Husband's age 29.61 (6.86) 29.22 (6.37) 34.85 (10.28) 29.25 (6.24) 29.51 (6.78) 32.13 (8.06)
Wife's age 26.35 (6.10) 26.15 (5.89) 27.72 (7.01) 28.92 (8.10) 26.28 (6.62) 28.48 (7.03)
Education categories, n (%)
Husband, graduate education 28,301 (10.96) 25,462 (11.10) 1,585 (9.20) 974 (11.59) 188 (8.34) 92 (9.65)
Husband, college diploma 4,469 (1.73) 3,915 (1.71) 284 (1.65) 196 (2.33) 51 (2.26) 23 (2.41)
Husband, high school diploma 103,289 (39.99) 92,211 (40.19) 6,473 (37.56) 3,311 (39.41) 903 (40.08) 391 (41.03)
Husband, secondary education 104,511 (40.46) 92.099 (40.14) 7,704 (44.70) 3,374 (40.16) 944 (41.90) 390 (40.92)
Husband, elementary education 17,732 (6.86) 15,772 (6.87) 1,189 (6.90) 547 (6.51) 167 (7.41) 57 (5.98)
Wife, graduate education 31,205 (12.08) 27,703 (12.07) 2,290 (13.29) 930 (11.07) 184 (8.17) 98 (10.28)
Wife, college diploma 7,103 (2.75) 6,117 (2.67) 619 (3.59) 249 (2.96) 75 (3.33) 43 (4.51)
Wife, high school diploma 114,002 (44.14) 101,396 (44.19) 7,591 (44.04) 3,624 (43.13) 958 (42.52) 433 (45.44)
Wife, secondary education 90,269 (34.95) 79,854 (34.80) 5,968 (34.63) 3,253 (38.72) 866 (38.44) 328 (34.42)
Wife, elementary education 15,723 (6.09) 14,389 (6.27) 767 (4.45) 346 (4.12) 170 (7.55) 51 (5.35)
Children, n (%)
No kids 81,090 (31.39) 66,533 (29.00) 9,452 (54.84) 3,780 (44.99) 741 (32.89) 522 (54.77)
First kid is female 61,879 (23.95) 56,187 (24.49) 3,040 (17.64) 1,875 (22.32) 590 (26.19) 187 (19.62)
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Table 1. Census of Separations (Panel B) 
 
PANEL B Full sample Husband Ital. - Wife 
Ital.
Husband Ital. - Wife 
For.
Husband For. - Wife 
Ital.
Husband For. - Wife 
For_same
Husband For. - Wife 
For_diff
Employment, n (%)
Both are employed 151,966 (58.82) 136,465 (59.47) 8,754 (50.79) 4,779 (56.88) 1,419 (62.98) 549 (57.61)
Husband is unemployed-Wife is employed 16,844 (6.52) 14,008 (6.10) 1,694 (9.83) 852 (10.14) 201 (8.92) 89 (9.34)
Husband is employed-Wife is unemployed 59,931 (23.20) 52,535 (22.90) 4,767 (27.66) 1,914 (22.78) 482 (21.39) 233 (24.45)
Both are unemployed 29,561 (11.44) 26,451 (11.53) 2,020 (11.72) 857 (10.20) 151 (6.70) 82 (8.60)
Income, in euros (sd)
Difference 4,251.16 (5927.39) 4,250.42 (5698.72) 4,593.68 (7695.30) 3548.32 (7158.04) 4,342.84 (6732.20) 4,431.33 (7252.19)
Husband's income 14,453.49 (5686.38) 14,433.11 (5580.09) 14,724.05 (6716.24) 14,196.52 (6108.27) 14,968.24 (5596.16) 15,305.22 (6087.12)
Wife's income 10,376.17 (5386.28) 10,376.61 (5347.71) 10,125.22 (5677.86) 10,734.30 (5785.81) 10,593.83 (5220.15) 10,805.47 (5524.26)
Religion: Wedding rite, n (%)
Civil 82,509 (31.94) 63,135 (27.51) 11,917 (69.14) 4,953 (58.95) 1,742 (77.32) 762 (79.96)
Religious 175,793 (68.06) 166,324 (72.49) 5,318 (30.86) 3,449 (41.05) 511 (22.68) 191 (20.04)
Property Regime, n (%)
Separate ownership 127,152 (49.23) 110,887 (48.33) 9,995 (57.99) 4,864 (57.89) 898 (39.86) 508 (53.31)
Joint ownership 131,150 (50.77) 118,572 (51.67) 7,240 (42.01) 3,538 (42.11) 1,355 (60.14) 445 (46.69)
Marriage history, n (%)
Husband First-Wife First 246,667 (95.50) 220,877 (96.26) 15,072 (87.45) 7,784 (92.64) 2,091 (92.81) 843 (88.46)
Husband First-Wife Second 4,351 (1.68) 3,040 (1.32) 840 (4.87) 341 (4.06) 75 (3.33) 55 (5.77)
Husband Second-Wife First 5,048 (1.95) 3,817 (1.66) 933 (5.41) 204 (2.43) 58 (2.57) 36 (3.78)
Husband asks for the separation 21,142 (8.18) 17,833 (7.77) 2,499 (14.50) 529 (6.30) 177 (7.86) 104 (10.91)
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Census data do not provide information on incomes. As such, we imputed the spouses’ 
incomes by matching our data with the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Households’ Income and Wealth 
of 2010. The match is done by defining “cells” on the basis of age, education, sex, and place of 
residence, and by attributing to each spouse in our dataset’s cell the median income of the 
corresponding cell recorded in the Bank of Italy survey. The figures in Panel B of Table 1 show that 
all types of couples are quite similar in terms of (imputed) income and income differences between 
spouses. 
 
Commitment to Marriage 
We do not observe the religious beliefs of spouses. Nevertheless, we know their choice of a 
religious or a civil wedding rite. A religious wedding rite is automatically registered by the Italian 
law. The substantial difference between a religious and civil rite, apart from the choreography of the 
ceremony, is that the Catholic rite, which is by far the most common, does not contemplate the 
possibility of a divorce3: “what God has joined together, let man not separate” (Mark, 10:9). Should 
spouses decide to separate, their decision would not be recorded by the Church, and spouses would 
be discriminated by the Catholic community and denied access to the Sacraments (like Eucharist or 
Last Rite). In our sample, the vast majority, 72.5 percent of Italian-only marriages, were celebrated 
according to a religious rite. This percentage falls dramatically for all other marriages, with inter-
ethnic marriages of different birth countries at the lowest (20 percent) followed by foreign co-ethnic 
marriages (23 percent), inter-ethnic with Italian husband (31 percent) and wife (41 percent). This is 
not surprising, given that, unlike Italian couples, inter-ethnic couples do not always share the same 
religion. Recall, however, that a vast majority of inter-ethnic marriages involves Europeans and 
Southern Americans who are prevalently Christians (although not necessarily Catholic). We will 
interpret the choice of the rite as a proxy for religiously motivated commitment to marriage. 
The Italian law requires that, before marrying, the couple expresses a preference for a 
separate or a common property regime. In the former, the property (e.g., a house) acquired after the 
marriage is attributed pro-rata depending on the spouses’ contributions; in the “common” regime 
the new property is considered “joint property” of the couple. Clearly, the latter choice implies a 
higher litigation costs in case of separation. We will interpret the choice of property regime as a 
proxy of (non-religiously motivated) ex-ante commitment to the marriage. Table 1 Panel B shows 
that more Italian inter-ethnic couples, about 58 percent, choose a “separation regime” compared to 
Italian-only couples (48 percent). Note however that this result in preference is reversed when we 
move to marriages celebrated in the most recent period (not shown in the table). 
                                                          
3 The marriage can however be declared “void” by the “Sacra Rota” tribunal of the Vatican through a very costly process.  
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Marriage history and “balance-of-power” 
Finally, in terms of marriage history, inter-ethnic marriages feature a considerably larger 
share of spouses at their second (or higher) marriage, compared to Italian co-ethnic ones. About 
12.5 percent (7.3 percent) of inter-ethnic marriages with Italian husbands (wives) have at least one 
of the spouses who has remarried, compared to only 3.7 percent in Italian co-ethnic marriages. The 
spouse at his second (or higher) wedding in inter-ethnic couples is more often the Italian one. 
Finally, an interesting feature of our data concerns the information on whether it is the 
husband, wife, or both, who is applying for the separation, which we interpret as a measure of the 
spouses’ “balance of power” within the couple. Separations are typically consensual or requested by 
the wife. Among Italian co-ethnic couples, only 7.8 percent of separations are unilaterally requested 
by the husband. Interestingly, this percentage rises significantly to 14.5 percent for Italian husbands 
in inter-ethnic couples, while it falls somewhat to 6.3 percent for foreign husbands in inter-ethnic 
marriages. This may suggest that Italian spouses in inter-ethnic couples are relatively more 
“powerful” than those in co-ethnic marriages. 
 
4. Econometric Analysis 
In this section we ask whether the difference in the average marriage longevity between 
inter- and co-ethnic couples discussed above persists when we control for the spouses’ 
characteristics. We will adopt different methodological approaches in order to check for the 
robustness of the results. We start by estimating a survival model for the time to separation. This 
gives us a simple benchmark for the importance of inter-ethnic marriages.  
 
4.1 Hazard rates 
Next we estimate the hazard rate of a separation. Hazard rates are common in empirical and 
theoretical labour economics, although less so in the empirical literature on marriages. The hazard 
rate for a couple m at time t, hm(t), is the probability that the couple will separate in the interval t, 
t+dt, conditional upon the marriage having survived until time t. Hazard rates are modelled as a 
function of each spouses’ characteristics, and are estimated by using the Cox proportional hazard 
rate regression model (Cox, 1972). The first column of Table 2 shows the estimation results when 
the time to separation, _t, is assumed to depend only on the binary dummy variable “mixed”, which 
takes the value of 1 if the spouses are born in different countries, and 0 otherwise. All the 
regressions in the table include year dummies and continent-of-birth dummies (Europe, Asia-
Pacific, Middle East-North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America-Caribbean, and North 
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America). A coefficient’s estimate for the inter-ethnic dummy above (below) the value of one 
means a higher (lower) hazard rate of inter-ethnic relative to co-ethnic couples, and thus a shorter 
marriage. Controlling for time effects and continent of birth, we obtain a (statistically significant) 
estimate of the coefficient of 1.65 (see the first column in Table 2). This implies that an inter-ethnic 
marriage has an instantaneous probability to break up that is 65 percent higher than a co-ethnic 
marriage. The consequence is that inter-ethnic marriages last on average 5.9 years less than the 
average.4 
The second column in the table introduces the finer definition of inter-ethnic marriages 
discussed in the previous section. This regression excludes the marriages between Italians, such that 
the estimated coefficients indicate the hazard rates relative to this couple. Given that all coefficients 
exceed unity, the Italian co-ethnic marriage is the most durable type, followed by marriages of co-
ethnic foreign spouses. The least durable are marriages of inter-ethnic foreign couples, which 
display a hazard rate that is almost twice that of the Italian co-ethnic couple. Inter-ethnic marriages 
with Italian husbands are slightly more at risk of dissolution than inter-ethnic couples with Italian 
wives but the difference is not statistically significant.  This finding is somewhat at odds with 
Manasse and See (2013), which find that the probability of marriage ending in a separation is higher 
for inter-ethnic couples with Italian wives relative to inter-ethnic couples with Italian husbands.5 
Given that survival rates do not differ significantly according to genre, the next analyses will 
concentrate on the binary classification of mixed (different country of birth) vs non-mixed. 
The third column in Table 2 introduces individual characteristics of the couples: age, 
previous marriages, children, education, employment status, and imputed income. The main result 
shown in column 3 of Table 2 is that introducing additional controls does not reduce the coefficient 
of the “mixed” dummy variable, which remains statistically different from zero and actually rises to 
1.77, implying a negative impact of an inter-ethnic marriage on duration of 6.5 years. 
  
                                                          
4 Given that the average time to separation is 15, a simple estimate of the difference between the duration of the average and the 
inter-ethnic marriages, is d= 15 *(1- (1 /h)), where h is the estimated relative hazard rate. 
5 The two findings are not necessarily in contradiction: the current sample of analysis looks at marriages that end up in separations, 
so that it is conceivable that a type of couple may have a lower probability of separation at marriage, but, conditional on separating, 
splits earlier. 
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Table 2. Hazard Rates Estimates for Co- and Interethnic Couples (Cox Regressions) 
 
 t: 1947-2010 t:1947-2010 t:1947-2010 t:1980-2010 t:1994-2010 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Mixed 1.6551***  1.7718*** 1.7381*** 1.1887*** 
 (0.016)  (0.035) (0.036) (0.030) 
Husband Ital.- Wife For.  1.7403***    
  (0.020)    
Wife Ital.-Husband For   1.5644***    
  (0.026)    
Husband For.–Wife For_same  1.4586***    
  (0.051)    
Husband For.–Wife For_diff.  1.9196***    
  (0.108)    
Husband Second-Wife Second      0.7206*** 0.6872*** 
 
0.7748*** 
   (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) 
Husband First - Wife Second     0.9371*** 0.8900*** 0.9483** 
   (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Husband Second - Wife First   0.8258*** 0.7873*** 0.8541*** 
   (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) 
Husband_age   1.0357*** 1.0271*** 1.0098*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Wife_age   1.0354*** 1.0284*** 1.0091*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Wife_education   0.9371*** 0.9539*** 0.9581*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Husband_education   1.0748*** 1.0671*** 1.0197*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
No kids   2.1110*** 2.1979*** 1.7464*** 
   (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) 
Sex of first kid_F   1.7568*** 1.4185*** 0.9961 
   (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Husband_une-Wife_emp   1.0392*** 1.0390*** 1.0736*** 
   (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) 
Husband_emp-Wife_une   1.0797*** 1.2272*** 1.0789*** 
   (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) 
Husband_une-Wife_une   0.7680*** 1.2445*** 1.1189*** 
   (0.013) (0.023) (0.024) 
log_Income_Wife   1.1314*** 1.1195*** 1.0110* 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Log_Income_Husband   1.2920*** 1.1571*** 1.0363*** 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Joint Ownership   0.8834*** 0.8689*** 0.9737*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
religion   0.8898*** 0.9166*** 0.9017*** 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Log_dist   0.8327*** 0.8338*** 0.9684** 
   (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) 
Husband_asks_separation   0.9908 1.0421*** 1.1549*** 
   (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) 
Year control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 251,080 251,080 251,080 218,237 129,355 
Wald Statistic 4397 4569 66273 89375 15851 
Separations ISTAT datasets (2008-2010), Italy. Hazard rates reported . The reference omitted group is of Homogamous Italian 
couples at first marriage. Inter-ethnic refers to families where one spouse is native and the other one was born abroad. Region and 
year of marriage fixed effects are included in all specifications. Columns (4-5) report estimates for specific marriage year categories. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The other coefficients of column 3 confirm many of the findings of the literature. 
Controlling for time and regional effects, we find that couples with no children have an 
instantaneous probability of a break-up that is double than that of couples with at least one kid.6 
Moreover, the hazard rate is higher for spouses at their first marriage relative to those who re-
married. The effect is stronger when the husband is at his first marriage and the wife is at her 
second. Couples who marry at a younger age show a higher hazard rate of separation, and this is 
true for both spouses (see the significant coefficient of both the wife’s age at marriage and of the 
age difference between husband’s and wife’s ages). We find an interesting asymmetric effect of 
education on the separation rate. More educated wives tend to separate earlier, while more educated 
husbands later. This may be due to the fact that more educated women are economically more 
“independent” from men or are more confident in finding a better match, although this effect holds 
even when, as we do, we control for spouses’ incomes. 
Indeed, the estimated coefficients of spouses’ incomes are above one, which says that higher 
income spouses have a higher break-up probability. A separation is a costly endeavour, as it often 
implies a doubling of expenditures, such as house rents, for a given family income. Thus, 
“freedom” from an unhappy relationship is a “normal” good. 
The labour market characteristics are also quite interesting: when either spouse is 
unemployed, while the other is employed, the hazard rate of separation is significantly above one, 
implying a shorter marriage. This finding is consistent with the results coming from the sociological 
literature on the impact of unemployment on divorce rates (Killewalda, 2016; Lester, 1996). 
However, when both spouses are unemployed the marriage survival rate increases sharply (the 
hazard falls to 0.77) implying a longer-than-average duration of about 4.5 years. One possible 
interpretation is that spouses act egoistically: the employed spouse who is also the economically 
stronger party (particularly if he is the husband) may decide to leave the unemployed partner, who 
has become a psychological and economic burden.  However, when both spouses are unemployed, 
no one has an incentive to leave the other, given the high costs of a separation. 
Column 3 in Table 2 introduces other covariates which are not directly related to the 
spouses’ economic situation or education. Couples whose first-born is female show a significantly 
higher separation rate compared to other couples. This confirms the result obtained by Dahl and 
Moretti (2008), who found evidence of a gender bias against girls in the parents’ decision to 
separate. 
                                                          
6 We omit from the regression variable “number of children” of the couple at the separation date. This variable is significantly 
negatively associated to the separation rate, although reverse causality (i.e., more stable couples have more children) cannot be easily 
ruled out. 
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We also account for geographical distance which is usually considered a measure of cultural 
distance. We calculate the (log) distance between places of birth of Italian spouses from the Geo 
data base. As explained earlier, we are interested in exploring whether the “North-South” cultural 
divide (stereotyped by an efficient/work-oriented North vs a familial/corrupt South) plays any role 
in marriage resilience. For inter-ethnic couples, we calculate the distance between countries’ 
capitals (Rome for Italian inter-ethnic marriages). Surprisingly, we find that a greater distance 
between birth places is associated to longer-lasting marriages, implying a sort of negative 
assortative mating. Rather than pointing to a North-South cultural divide, this finding is consistent 
with idea that spouses may specialize in their respective comparative advantages (e.g., the 
northerner in “bread-winning” and the southerner in home-cooking, for a stereotyped example), 
raising the value of the match and delaying separation. 
We also use a dummy variable for the choice of religious versus non-religious wedding rite, 
and one for the choice of a common versus separation property regime, our measures of 
commitment to the marriage discussed earlier. As expected, the coefficient of the religious rite 
dummy (“Religion”) is significantly below one, implying that religious marriages last about two 
years longer than civil marriages. The “joint property regime” variable is also significantly 
associated to a lower separation hazard rate, or to a longer lasting marriage, confirming our 
interpretation. 
Finally, we test if the identity of the spouse asking for the separation is informative about the 
marriage survival rate. We employ the dummy variable “separation request” which takes the value 
of 1 if the process of separation is initiated by the husband, and zero otherwise (either joint or wife 
request). The estimated coefficient of this variable is not statistically significantly different from 
one, indicating that the identity of the “first-mover” is not relevant for marriage duration. 
 
4.1.1 Cohort Effects 
We saw earlier that inter-ethnic marriages were very rare until recently. Moral values and 
civil attitudes towards the family, marriage, and divorce have dramatically changed in Italy since 
divorce was legalized in the late seventies. Indeed, the fraction of marriages ending in divorce has 
almost doubled, from 2% in 1980 to 9% in 2014 (Eurostat, 2016). Since then, single-parent families 
have become more common and the social stigma associated to separations have disappeared. Even 
the Church is now revising her policy of excluding divorcees from Sacraments. Our sample records 
Italian co-ethnic marriages dating back up to 65 years, while inter-ethnic marriages only go back 12 
years at most. As a result, the shorter duration of inter-ethnic marriages may simply reflect the fact 
that they were celebrated much more recently (cohort effect), at a time when separations had 
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become much more common, for all marriages. To test this hypothesis, we perform all the previous 
estimations by restricting the sample to marriages celebrated since 1980 (about 218,237 
observations compared to the initial 251,080, fourth column of the Table 2), and further to 
marriages celebrated since 1994 (129,355 observations, see the last column of the table). We 
consider these cohorts of marriages so that there are at least 15 years (the average marriage 
duration) between the different cohorts. Looking in particular to the results for the most recent 
marriages, the size of the estimated effect of an inter-ethnic marriage falls considerably, while 
retaining its statistical significance. It now implies that an inter-ethnic marriage is 1.2 years shorter 
than a co-ethnic one. Note, however, that by construction, the duration of the most recent marriages 
falls moving to more recent cohorts, since we only consider separations that occur in the period 
2008-2010. What is important, however, is that the relative effect of inter-ethnic marriages falls 
considerably, as reflected in the estimated coefficient of the variable “mixed”. Considering the 
sample all marriages, the longevity of an inter-ethnic marriage is 43 percent (=6.5/15)  shorter than 
the average, while this effect falls to about 16 percent (=1.2/7.5) when considering only marriages 
celebrated since 1994. Most of the other coefficients in the regressions estimated for the more 
recent marriages are very similar to the ones estimated for the entire sample, with the exception of 
the asymmetric effect of the unemployment status, which disappears, and of the husband 
separation-request, which, on the contrary, becomes significant ad positively associated to the 
hazard rate.  
Interestingly, the effect of a first-born daughter becomes insignificant, suggesting a shift 
away from female discrimination. The main result we draw from this section is that the longevity of 
inter-ethnic and co-ethnic marriages appears to be converging when we consider more recent 
marriages. 
 
4.2 Survival Treatment Effects Estimation 
This section addresses the “causal” relationship between marrying “over the moor” (i.e., a 
foreigner) and the associated marriage duration. The first issue is the “missing counterfactual” that 
we have discussed earlier: what if native spouses in inter-ethnic partnerships had married co-natives 
(and vice-versa)? To address this question, we estimate a “treatment-effect” model of duration, 
where “mixed marriage” is the “treatment.” We employ different techniques in order to obtain 
robust results. The first is the “regression adjustment” approach (Wooldridge, 2010). 
This methodology fits one model of duration separately for the “treated” (inter-ethnic 
couples) and one for “non-treated” (co-ethnic), using the same covariates employed in the Cox 
regressions. Predicted durations are used for estimating the marriages’ “potential duration”. The 
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average “treatment effect” (ATE) of “inter-ethnic marriage” is the average difference in the time to 
separation that would occur if all couples were inter-ethnic (obtained by predicting durations using 
the estimates of the inter-ethnic model) relative to that which would occur if they were all co-ethnic 
(obtained by predicting durations using the estimates of the co-ethnic model). The results are shown 
in Table 3. The ATE in the first column refers to the entire sample. Here an inter-ethnic marriage 
reduces the time-to-separation by about 2.2 years, relative to an average duration of more than 15 
years for co-ethnic marriages (15% reduction). The coefficient is highly statistically significant, and 
the effect is much smaller than that obtained in the corresponding hazard rate regressions (6.5 
years). Table 3 also reports the ATE for the restricted sample of separations of marriages celebrated 
since 1980, and since 1994. The size of the estimated effect of inter-ethnic marriages is reduced to 
about 1.6 years, and is not statistically different from zero in the sample of the most recent 
marriages. Again, we find evidence of a convergence in duration over time. 
 
Table 3: Average treatment Effect of Inter-Ethnic Marriages 
 
      ATE 1947-2010 
 
1980-2010 1994-2010 
 
     Mixed 
     (1 vs 0) -2.2094** 
 
-1.6636*** 
 
-0.6371*** 
 
(0.2795) 
 
(-0.2150) 
 
(0.1198) 
POmean 
     Mixed 
     0 15.3254*** 
 
12.2462*** 
 
7.1406*** 
 
(0.0241) 
 
(0.0188) 
 
(0. .0139) 
      Number of obs 251,145 
 
218,302 
 
129,419 
*The results do not consider time and regions fixed effects 
 
 
4.3 Endogenous Treatment Effects 
In order to interpret the inter-ethnic marriage as a “cause” of early break-up, the potential 
outcomes (the duration of a marriage) should be independent of “treatment” assignment (the 
decision of spouses to marry a partner born in a different country). In our case, however, the 
treatment is not necessarily a random event, and may depend on unobserved characteristics of the 
spouse that also affect the marriage duration. Consider the following examples. Suppose that 
spouses who have a “liberal/secular attitude” are more open to cultural diversity and are more likely 
to choose an inter-ethnic marriage. Because of their attitudes, they may be less attached to the idea 
of “un-dissolvability” of marriage, and are more prone to separation. If we do not control for these 
characteristics, we may attribute the shorter duration of the marriage to its “inter-ethnic” nature, and 
overestimate its negative effect on duration. In other words, it may be that more “secular” people 
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are keener about marrying a foreigner and are culturally less averse to a divorce, rather than that 
inter-ethnic couples experience harsher conflicts and therefore split sooner. The bias could go either 
way, however. Consider a native spouse who is less “marketable” on the Italian marriage market 
due to some unmeasured trait (e.g., has a health problem). Alternatively, the foreign spouse may be 
in “excess genre-supply,” as for example, a female from Eastern Europe or a male from Africa.7 As 
a result, both spouses may be more averse to separation because they are less likely to find another 
partner. If we neglect the fact that the same characteristics that induce spouses to self-select into 
inter-ethnic marriages also make them hold on longer to each other, we may in this case 
underestimate the negative impact of inter-ethnic marriages on its duration. Summarizing the 
discussion, for interpreting our “inter-ethnic” marriage dummy effect as a “cause” of early 
separation, we would require “conditional independence”: the assignment of individuals to the 
treatment (the inter-ethnic marriage) conditional on covariates, should be “as good as random.”8 
 
4.3.1 Linear Model with Endogenous Treatment 
We address this issue by implementing a linear model with endogenous treatment 
(Heckman, 1976, 1978). This approach estimates two separate models: one for the outcome, time-
to-separation for the couple j, 𝑡𝑗 in equation (1), and one for the treatment assignment, 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑗 in 
equation (2) below. The marriage duration depends on covariates 𝑥𝑗’s, while the assignment of 
couple j to an inter-ethnic marriage depends on covariates 𝑤𝑗, which may  include the  𝑥𝑗’s. The 
idea is to account for the possibility that some of the couple’s unobserved characteristics that affect 
marriage longevity, and captured by 𝜀𝑗, may be correlated to those which influence the choice of an 
inter-ethnic marriage, 𝑢𝑗  , where 𝑢𝑗  and 𝜀𝑗 are error terms that are assumed to be normal, with zero 
mean and covariance matrix Σ , and are assumed to be independent of the covariates x, w. 
(1)    𝑡𝑗 =  𝑥𝑗𝛽 + 𝛾𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗  
(2)    𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑗 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑗𝛿 + 𝑢𝑗 > 0
0 , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  
(3) Σ =  [
𝜎2 𝜌𝜎
𝜌𝜎 1
] 
The important parameter in the above model is ρ, the coefficient of correlation between the 
disturbances of the two equations. If this parameter is negative and statistically significant, for 
example, the unobserved characteristics that are associated to shorter marriage durations are also 
associated to higher propensities to marry inter-ethnically, as in the “liberal/secular attitude” 
                                                          
7 In order to account for this, we would need information on the genre balances for all countries of origin, at the time of the marriage 
and in each region of residence, which is not available. 
8 Wooldridge (2010) 
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example discussed previously. In this case, accounting for this effect should result in a smaller 
estimated negative impact of the inter-ethnic marriage on duration (a higher absolute value for γ 
<0), relatively to the previous estimates. If the estimate of 𝜌 is positive and significant, the opposite 
is true as in the “physically ill/excess supply” examples, where couples who self-select into inter-
ethnic partnerships have marriages that are more likely to last longer. In this case, correcting for this 
correlation should produce a larger (negative) estimated impact of inter-ethnic marriage on 
duration. 
The duration equations are reported in columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table 4, for the different 
cohorts according to the years of marriage formation. The regressions contain the same covariates 
as the previous models. In the self-selection equation (2) reported in columns 2, 4, and 6 for the 
different cohorts, we have included variables that may affect both the choice of an inter-ethnic 
marriage and its duration, such as the spouses’ age at marriage and the first marriage dummy 
variable, as well one new variable, “same religion not Italian.” This variable is constructed from the 
Pew Research Centre data for the religion diffusion in different countries in 2010, and captures the 
fact the foreign spouse in the Italian inter-ethnic marriages are born in predominantly Christian 
countries. The idea is to capture a preference for marrying those foreigners who share the same (or a 
similar) religion. 
The results are reported in Table 4.  All covariates in the duration equations (columns 1, 3, 
and 5) appear significant and, in general, with the same sign as in previous regression estimations, 
although the size of the coefficients generally decrease as the sample sizes shrink. In particular, the 
negative effect of an inter-ethnic marriage on the marriage duration falls from 5.1 to 3.2 years, 
when we restrict the analysis from the entire sample (column 1) to that of marriages celebrated from 
1980 (column 3), partially reflecting the widespread reduction in all marriages’ life. In the most 
recent sample (column 5), the coefficient becomes negative, which literally implies that inter-ethnic 
marriages last about 2 months longer than co-ethnic ones. As before, a religious rite and the choice 
of a common property regime are associated to a longer-lasting marriage. There are a few 
differences with respect to the previous estimations using Cox regressions. The first is the effect of 
the unemployed spouse, which was earlier shown to be associated with shorter marriage duration. 
Instead here, the unemployed husband/employed wife dummy variable is positively associated to 
duration. When we restrict the sample to more recent marriages the previous negative effect shows 
up. Another difference is the “balance-of-power” indicator, the husband’s application for 
separation, which becomes significant in the two more recent samples. Finally, here a marriage last 
longer when either spouse has remarried. 
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Table 4. Linear Model with Self-Selection into Inter-Ethnic Marriage 
 
 Duration 
1947-2010 
Inter-ethnic 
1947-2010 
Duration 
1980-2010 
Inter-ethnic 
1980-2010 
Duration 
1994-2010 
Inter-ethnic 
1994-2010 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Inter-ethnic -5.1472***  -3.1878***  -0.2291***  
 (0.151)  (0.121)  (0.087)  
Husband Second-Wife Second    3.0236*** 0.0093 2.8776*** 0.0165 0.9406*** 0.0295 
 (0.143) (0.042) (0.117) (0.042) (0.084) (0.046) 
Husband First - Wife Second   1.4052*** 0.3470*** 1.1490*** 0.3551*** 0.3514*** 0.3507*** 
 (0.111) (0.034) (0.093) (0.034) (0.063) (0.038) 
Husband Second - Wife First 1.7739*** 0.1022*** 1.5347*** 0.1012*** 0.5768*** 0.1149*** 
 (0.104) (0.031) (0.091) (0.031) (0.064) (0.035) 
Husband_age -0.2226*** 0.0245*** -0.1394*** 0.0238*** -0.0347*** 0.0234*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Wife_age -0.2715*** -0.0068*** -0.1830*** -0.0091*** -0.0362*** -0.0136*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Wife_education 0.6214***  0.3357***  0.1337***  
 (0.020)  (0.016)  (0.012)  
Husband_education -0.5448***  -0.3744***  -0.0631***  
 (0.020)  (0.016)  (0.012)  
No kids -1.8833***  -0.6790***  -0.3540***  
 (0.102)  (0.080)  (0.057)  
Sex of first kid_F -1.2929***  -1.3327***  -0.3051***  
 (0.076)  (0.061)  (0.046)  
Husband_une-Wife_emp 0.6503***  -2.1256***  -0.5846***  
 (0.126)  (0.094)  (0.068)  
Husband_emp-Wife_une -0.9433***  -0.5845***  -0.0092  
 (0.032)  (0.026)  (0.019)  
Husband_une-Wife_une -2.9075***  -0.9098***  -0.1074***  
 (0.041)  (0.031)  (0.023)  
log_Income_Wife -6.9289***  -5.4059***  -2.3992***  
 (0.043)  (0.033)  (0.023)  
Log_Income_Husband -4.9825***  -1.9819***  0.0311  
 (0.037)  (0.032)  (0.026)  
Joint Ownership 1.0601***  0.9174***  0.1362***  
 (0.034)  (0.027)  (0.020)  
Religious rite 1.4590***  0.8954***  0.4819***  
 (0.039)  (0.031)  (0.022)  
Log_dist 1.7872***  1.1358***  0.0888**  
 (0.072)  (0.059)  (0.043)  
Husband_asks_separation -0.1011  -0.2459***  -0.4845***  
 (0.063)  (0.049)  (0.036)  
       
Year control Yes  Yes  Yes  
Region control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
same_rel_no_Ita  3.1490***  3.1176***  3.0702*** 
  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.025) 
rho 0.0389***   0.0259***  -0.0264***  
 (0.0073)   (.0074)  (.0088)  
Observations 251,080  218,237  129,355  
Wald Statistic 153843  89375.50  25208.57  
Prob > chi2   0.0005  0.0005  0.0028  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Particularly interesting are the equations for the treatment assignment shown in columns 2, 
4, and 6. Spouses at their second (or later) marriages, mostly husbands, are more likely to self-select 
into inter-ethnic marriages. The husband’s age at marriage, unlike the wife’s, also comes out with a 
positive sign in all duration regressions, implying that older men and younger women are more 
likely to choose inter-ethnic marriages. A positive coefficient for the variable “same-religion-no-
Italian” indicates that an inter-ethnic marriage is more likely to occur when the foreign spouse is 
Catholic. This variable is strongly significant across all samples considered. This assortative mating 
for religious proximity is a plausible explanation for the relative scarcity of marriages of Italian 
women with foreign (non-Catholic) men, mostly from North Africa, and the relative abundance of 
marriages of Italian men with Eastern European women.  
One interesting feature of this model is the correlation coefficient ρ, which turns out 
significant and positive using the full sample, supporting the conjecture that unobservable features 
of the “ill” or “excess-supply” type induce self-selection into inter-ethnic marriages and are at the 
same time associated with longer marriages. However, when we move to the sample of marriages 
formed in 1994-2010 (column 6), the correlation coefficient ρ becomes negative, indicating the 
prevalence of the “secular/liberal attitude” bias that induces inter-ethnic marriages as well as early 
separation.  This result is consistent with the very small (and positive) effect that inter-ethnic 
marriages exert on duration for this sub-sample: we observe a full convergence in duration between 
co-ethnic and inter-ethnic marriages, which confirms the view that the Italian society is becoming 
more secular, with increased occurrence of inter-ethnic marriages and shorter marriages.  
 
5. Conclusions. 
This paper has exploited a novel dataset containing information on all the separations that 
took place in Italy in the years 2008-10 in order to assess the relative longevity of marriages 
involving spouses born in different countries. We measure marriage stability by its duration or 
longevity. On the average, an inter-ethnic marriage lasts about one-third less than a marriage 
between co-natives. Our main findings are as follows. First, even when we control for social and 
economic characteristics of the spouses, we find that an inter-ethnic marriage entails a significantly 
higher risk of separation. Second, separations tend to occur when spouses marry at younger ages, 
when either (but not both) is unemployed, when there are no kids, when the first kid is female, 
when spouses celebrate a religious wedding rite and choose a common property regime, when the 
wife/husband is more/less educated, and when spouses earn a higher income. Third, when we 
restrict the analysis to more recent marriages, we observe that co-ethnic and inter-ethnic marriages 
converge in longevity. Finally, we find evidence of self-selection into inter-ethnic marriages: 
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spouses which are either “less marketable” in the co-ethnic marriage market, or are “in excess 
supply” tend to self-select into inter-ethnic marriages. Also, spouses self-select into inter-ethnic 
couples more frequently when they share the same religion. In the most recent cohorts of marriages, 
we observe a different kind of self-selection: that of “less secular type” of spouses, who are more 
open to ethnic diversity and less attached to the marriage. Taken together with the estimated 
convergence in marriage longevity, this finding points to a society that is becoming open to cultural 
and ethnic diversity and more secular, and where integration of the recent waves of immigrants 
seems to proceed together with the acceptance of diversity.  
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